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Abstract
Increased competition for research funding has led to growth in proposal submissions and lower funding-success rates. An
agent-based model of the funding cycle, accounting for variations in program officer and reviewer behaviors, for a range of
funding rates, is used to assess the efficiency of different proposal-submission strategies. Program officers who use more
reviewers and require consensus can improve the chances of scientists submitting fewer proposals. Selfish or negligent
reviewers reduce the effectiveness of submitting more proposals, but have less influence as available funding declines.
Policies designed to decrease proposal submissions reduce reviewer workload, but can lower the quality of funded
proposals. When available funding falls below 10–15% in this model, the most effective strategy for scientists to maintain
funding is to submit many proposals.
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Introduction
At the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF), 96% of funds
are awarded through a competitive merit review [1]. Proposal
success rates across that agency, however, have decreased from
27% in 2002 to 20–22% in 2004–2008 [1]. As more scientists
compete for increasingly limited government funding, scientists
may feel pressure to submit more grant proposals (e.g., the number
of proposals received at NSF has increased 40% since 2001) [1].
These difficult conditions are familiar to practicing scientists and
are mirrored at agencies throughout the U.S. and internationally
[2].
This increased competition for limited resources has established
the scientific equivalent of the famous problem in game theory
known as the Prisoner’s Dilemma [3]. In the Scientist’s Dilemma
[4,5], the rational strategy for maximizing research funding is to
submit as many proposals as possible, yet, as in the classic form of
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, this strategy is less optimal than
cooperation. If scientists agreed to limit the number of proposals
that they submitted or were required to limit that number [3], they
would not incur the substantial time penalty of writing and
reviewing many proposals, but might retain equivalent chances for
funding. The costs of excessive competition extend beyond the
individual to science and society as a whole. The extra work
resulting from increasing numbers of proposals does not increase
the total pool of research money available to scientists but limits
their ability to conduct research, as well as to teach and mentor
students.
Under what conditions is submitting as many proposals as
possible an inefficient strategy? How do selfish or negligent
reviewers affect the peer-review process [6–8]? How is funding the
highest-quality research ensured? Above all, how do the rules of
the funding agency and the program officers’ approach to
decision-making affect the community?
Methods
To explore these questions, we employ an agent-based model of
peer review and funding, modified from [9]. Traditional
quantitative models use differential equations to represent
continuous flows. Agent-based models, in contrast, represent
complex systems through the interaction of discrete entities
(agents) in which the system behavior emerges through the
aggregate effects of these agent interactions. In the model of the
peer review system, the agents are (1) the scientists who write
proposals, (2) the other scientists, taken from that same pool, who
review those proposals, and (3) the funding agency program
officers who make funding decisions based in part upon those
reviews. A set of rules governs the response of these agents to
various conditions (e.g., the level of available funding).
In this system, proposal development is modeled as follows
(Fig. 1). A community of N scientists is composed of two evenly
sized groups. Group 1 (G1) produces one proposal every two time
units (split randomly between those times), whereas group 2 (G2)
produces a proposal every time unit. We set a time unit to six
months, award length to three years, and all grants to equal value.
G1 scientists who obtain funding do not submit new proposals
until the final year of the grant. In contrast, G2 scientists continue
to submit grant proposals regardless of their funding status. We
assume that the quality of an individual scientist (Qs) follows a
normal distribution with mean 100 and standard deviation 10.
Each scientist produces proposals of variable quality Qp, which are
drawn from a normal distribution with mean Qs and standard
deviation 5. These characteristics are identical in both groups.
Proposal review is then modeled (Fig. 2). Each proposal is
reviewed by K independent reviewers, randomly chosen by the
program officer of the funding agency from the N–1 available
scientists (that is, excluding the proposal author). No limits are
placed on the number of reviews that a scientist can conduct. The
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Figure 1. Proposal generation and submission process. Proposal generation by N scientists, of quality Qs, drawn from a normal population of
mean 100 and standard deviation 10. Proposals are of quality Qp, drawn from a normal population of mean Qs and standard deviation 5. Arrows
indicate the flow of decisions through the proposal submission process.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018680.g001
Figure 2. Proposal peer-review process. Proposal review process, accomplished by K scientists, randomly selected from the set of N-1 scientists
(excluding the scientist who submitted the proposal under consideration). Qs (R) is the scientific quality of the reviewer. Arrows indicate the flow of
decisions through the proposal review process.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018680.g002
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reviewers recommend to the program officer either to fund or to
decline. Each reviewer is one of three types: correct, harried or
selfish. The correct reviewer recommends funding only for high-
quality proposals, defined as those exceeding a minimum
threshold (i.e., in the top 16% of all proposals or at least one
standard deviation above the mean). The harried reviewer behaves
like the correct reviewer, but assesses proposal quality imperfectly.
This assessment is modeled as a normal distribution with mean Qp
and standard deviation 5; that is, the assessments are correct in the
mean but not necessarily on a case-by-case basis. Finally, selfish
reviewers recommend declining a proposal that is either superior
to their own work or below a minimum quality (i.e., if Qp is greater
than the Qs of the reviewer or less than 90% of the defined
minimum threshold). Thus, a low-quality scientist who is a selfish
reviewer might recommend rejection of nearly all proposals
considered, whereas a very high-quality scientist but selfish
reviewer would recommend rejection of relatively few high-quality
proposals.
Next, the funding decision is modeled (Fig. 3). The annual
budget for program officers is represented by a specified target
funding rate. In the first half-year, the program officer uses that
rate to estimate the number of fundable proposals and then funds
proposals with unanimously positive recommendations up to half
that limit; after which, all proposals are declined regardless of
quality. In the second half-year, this process is repeated. If there is
a surplus of funds at the end of the year, then the highest-rated
unfunded proposals of the last six months are reconsidered until
the target rate is reached.
The decision to fund reconsidered proposals is made according
to one of two program-officer types: correct or reputation-based.
The correct program officer has perfect knowledge of Qp and thus
can precisely rank proposals. The reputation-based program
officer is a correct program officer who substitutes quality of the
scientist Qs for Qp in the rankings. The model logic detailed in
Figures 1–3 was implemented in FORTRAN, with agent
properties developed using random number generators over a
long set of simulations (here, 2000 time steps).
Results
To start, we form a perfect scenario in which all reviewers and
the program officer are correct, and for which there are no
external funding limits (Table 1, case a). In this situation, the
highest-quality proposals are properly judged, and 30.2% of all
Figure 3. Program officer decision-making process. Proposal funding decision process, accomplished by the funding agency program officer.
Arrows indicate the flow of decisions through the funding decision process.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018680.g003
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proposals are funded. Although the funded-proposal quality for
the two groups is similar, owing to their divergent proposal-
submission strategies, G2 obtains 76.9% of the available funding.
Furthermore, because high-quality G1 scientists tend to get funded
and drop out of the funding cycle for three years, the medium- and
low-quality G1 scientists are left to compete against all the
persistent G2 scientists. Consequently, G1’s success rate of 21.3%
is considerably lower than G2’s 34.6%.
Next, we form a baseline case with a mix of reviewers (60%
correct, 20% harried and 20% selfish) and a target funding rate of
15% (Table 1, case b). This target rate is half that of the perfect
scenario, so the participants feel some funding pressure. Funded-
proposal quality is higher in both groups, but is several points
higher in G1 than in G2, with G2 receiving only 45% of available
funding despite submitting more than twice as many proposals.
Owing to increased proposal submissions from both groups in the
tighter funding climate, the average number of reviews conducted
per scientist increases by 13% over the perfect scenario. How do
these changes, including a nearly 33% swing in funding share
between the two groups, occur?
The decisions by the program officer (number of reviewers and
program officer type) determine the outcome of many proposals at
NSF, where about 25% of funding decisions are made by the
program officer contrary to the reviewer recommendations [10],
and in the model (Fig. 4). Generally, G2 scientists command an
increasing share of the funding as the number of reviewers increase,
except in two situations (Fig. 4). If correct or reputation-based
program officers require unanimity among four or more reviewers,
then the G2 share of funding drops considerably compared to what
would have happened had the program officer selected fewer
reviewers or not required unanimity in the reviewer recommenda-
tions. If a program officer were more selective by raising the
minimum threshold to the top 2% (at least two standard deviations
above the mean), funding for G1 increases because relatively more
G2 proposals are declined (Table 1, case c).
Counterintuitively, imperfections in the review process are also
key. The presence of non-correct reviewers retards the effective-
ness of the G2 strategy, especially when program officers use
more reviewers and require unanimity (Fig. 5a). If, however,
program officers fund proposals receiving one decline recom-
mendation (Fig. 5b), then the success rate of G2 is nearly
insensitive to the percentage of non-correct reviewers and
increases slightly with more reviewers. As funding diminishes,
G2 receives an increasing share of the resources under a program
officer requiring unanimity (Fig. 6a). In contrast, for a program
manager funding proposals with one decline recommendation,
G2’s share is less sensitive to the percentage of non-correct
reviewers and reaches a maximum around 10–20% target
funding rates (Fig. 6b).
The quality of funded proposals is also sensitive to the reviewer
mix for G1 and G2, as suggested in actual funding data [6,11] and
Figure 4. Group 2 share (%) of available funding based on
the review process. Shown for the two types of program officers
(correct, circles; reputation-based, squares), using from two to five
external reviewers and forming an initial funding decision based on
unanimous (red symbols) or non-unanimous recommendations (blue
symbols).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018680.g004
Table 1. Agent-based model experimental results.
Experiment Group 1 Group 2
Group 2 hare of
Funding (%)
Scientist unding
Success (%)
Average Quality of
Funded Proposals
Scientist unding
Success (%)
Average Quality of
Funded Proposals
a. Perfect 21.3 111.6 34.6 112.1 76.9
b. Baseline 25.2 115.0 9.9 112.8 44.8
c. More Selective (Top 2%) 34.8 111.6 4.5 116.4 19.8
d. Positive Feedback 17.8 117.6 13.5 113.8 60.6
e. Negative Feedback 33.9 109.7 5.6 112.0 25.1
f. Limiting G2 Scientists to
One Grant
29.4 109.1 4.8 112.5 19.1
g. Cooling-Off Period 12.5 115.7 17.4 113.0 57.7
Results are stratified according to the two scientist groups. Shown for each group are the scientist funding success and the average quality of funded proposals. The
group 2 share of the available funds is also shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018680.t001
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in models [9,12]. Although not explicitly modeled, the effect of
increasing reviewer load can be discerned from these results—as
correct reviewers are converted into harried ones by this load, the
funding share of G2 declines (Fig. 6) and the quality of the funded
proposals slightly improves. This feedback suggests that scientists,
were they aware of this effect, would write fewer grant proposals to
maximize their efficiency. A critical caveat, however, is that this
feedback loses effectiveness once funding rates decline below about
7% (Fig. 6).
So far, we have assumed that no relationship exists between the
number of proposals submitted and their quality. However, a
positive feedback might exist if G2 scientists submit many
proposals owing to the highly capable and productive research
groups that they have assembled. Further, individual proposals
might benefit from peer review and be improved for subsequent
submission. On the other hand, a negative feedback might exist if
G2 scientists simply churn out mediocre-quality proposals. Not
surprisingly, positive feedbacks (defined as a 5-point boost in Qp
for G2) increase G2’s share of the funding, whereas negative
feedbacks (a 5-point drop in Qp for G2) do the opposite (Table 1,
cases d and e). Interestingly, the quality of funded proposals by
G1 scientists also increases for positive feedbacks and decreases
for negative feedbacks, as only the success of the G1 scientists
depends upon the level of the competition from G2. Most likely
positive, neutral and negative feedbacks on rapid-fire proposal
Figure 6. Group 2 share (%) of available funding based on
target funding rate. Shown as a function of the target funding rate
(%) and the reviewers who are of the correct type (%). Selfish reviewers
are fixed at 20% and the remainder are harried reviewers. The program
officer is correct and initial funding decisions are made using (a) five
unanimous reviewer recommendations or (b) allowing one negative
recommendation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018680.g006
Figure 5. Group 2 share (%) of available funding based on the
reviewers. Shown as a function of the number of reviewers and the
reviewers who are of the correct type (%). Selfish reviewers are fixed at 20%
and the remainder are harried reviewers. The program officer is correct
and initial funding decisions are made using (a) unanimous reviewer
recommendations or (b) allowing one negative recommendation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018680.g005
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writers all exist in any mix of individuals, and their relative
proportions ultimately would determine their importance to
funding success.
What if the behaviors of G1 or G2 change? If G1 scientists are
allowed to pursue additional grants regardless of current funding
status, only minor changes from the baseline occur (not shown),
whereas limiting G2 scientists to one funded grant substantially
reduces G2’s share of funding and success rate (Table 1, case f). In
this latter scenario, the reviewer load decreases by 22% but the
quality of G1’s funded grants declines, owing to the reduced
competition from G2.
Funding agencies also have tried to decrease the number of
proposal submissions through other means. For example, the U.K.
’s Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC)
bars proposal submissions from scientists for 12 months if, in the
preceding two years, they have had at least three proposals ranked
in the bottom half of a funding prioritization list or were rejected
by a panel review and have an overall success rate of less than 25%
[2,13]. A simulation incorporating this "cooling-off period"
reduces the proposal-review burden by 34% relative to the
baseline, largely by equalizing G1 and G2 submission rates.
Collateral effects include a halving of funding success for G1
scientists with an increase in the G2 funding share to 57.7%,
owing to the differential removal of lower-quality G2 proposal
writers (Table 1, case g).
Discussion
Our results emphasize the importance of the program
officer’s approach and funding agency’s rules, which can vary
substantially across divisions within the same agency and over
time [8,14,15]. This is consistent with recent research that
suggests that optimal decision-making is a complex interaction
of factors including the number of judges, the accuracy of
those judges, and the decision rules used [12]. Program
officers who use more reviewers (e.g., for NSF mail reviews,
the FY 2009 average is more than four) [1] and require
unanimity limit the efficiency of G2’s many-proposal strategy.
Program officers who base decisions on the quality of the
scientist fund higher-quality proposals and increase the success
rate of individual scientists.
Highly capable research clusters may profitably and efficiently
choose to submit many proposals, which may or may not be
tolerable from the perspectives of science and society because of
the increased proposal burden and possibly lower-quality funded
research [11]. Reducing the proposal burden by the cooling-off
period or by limiting grants to one award per investigator appear
to achieve their primary aim, but can produce collateral effects on
funded-proposal quality and the success rate of individuals. The
negative feedback from proposal churning may be sufficiently
corrective such that additional constraints may be unnecessary.
Once available funding falls below 10–15% in our model,
however, submitting many proposals, despite the tax that this
represents on both individuals and their scientific communities,
appears to be the only recourse if the goal is to maintain research
funding.
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